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Abstract 
This paper assesses whether Chapter 11 is a form of subsidy for US airlines. US airlines have 
used Chapter 11 many times to restructure their operations. This has been criticized as a 
subsidy by major non US airlines, airlines associations and governments for a long time. 
Recently, in the “level playing field” debate between the Gulf and US carriers, the former 
have claimed that Chapter 11 is a form of subsidy. Applying legal and economic perspectives 
of subsidy, we examine the different opportunities of Chapter 11 to reduce airlines’ costs. It 
is argued that most of the forms available, such as the modification of collective bargaining 
or the renegotiation of debts, do not constitute a subsidy. Only the termination of pension 
plans might involve a subsidy, but only using a legal definition of doubtful relevance 
(involving the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp, being a public body, but acting as an 
insurance agency funded by the participating firms), since there is normally no use of public 
funds.  
 





1 Introduction  
In the US, bankruptcy protection is regulated under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Law. This mechanism, which allows firms to organize and restructure, has been 
employed by all major US network carriers in the past (as well as by thousands of other firms 
from every segment of the US economy). This process has been criticized as it allows 
potentially inefficient firms to reorganize (Hotchkiss, 1995), and that the outcome may be 
such that firms, or industries, will be left with chronic inefficiencies (Jensen, 1991). An 
example occurs with the US airline industry, which has experienced recurring filings for 
bankruptcy protection.  
Major concerns have been expressed that Chapter 11 can be perceived as a form of a 
subsidy, which ultimately distorts the level playing field in domestic and especially  
international markets. In this paper, we concentrate on the latter. Existing studies (see 
overview by Tretheway and Andriulaitis, 2015) identify various factors that could tilt the 
level playing field in aviation. Subsidies play a major role in this regard, however bankruptcy 
protection laws, like Chapter 11, are not addressed. 
 In the discussion of aviation, it is often claimed that Chapter 11 involves a subsidy to US 
airlines. Chapter 11 has been characterised by IATA Vision 2050 (2010) as a market 
distorting subsidy and as an obstacle to raise the profitability to a normal level. The European 
and US delegations also disagreed on Chapter 11 in their negotiations for an Open Sky Area. 
However, the most recent, and most controversial, subsidy claim has been made by the Gulf 
airlines (Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways) in their response to the US airlines, which had 
argued that the Gulf countries subsidised their airlines, and thus there was not a “level 
playing field”. The Gulf airlines responded by arguing that the US airlines were subsidised 
in several ways, including through Chapter 11.    
This paper sheds light on the question as to whether Chapter 11 involves a subsidy or not 
from legal and economic points of view. In order to decide if Chapter 11 should be regarded 
as providing an avenue for subsidy, we analyse, firstly, the bankruptcy laws and regulations 
of the United States Code (U.S.C.) and identify the core opportunities which companies 
under Chapter 11 can use to avoid liquidation. Secondly, we define and compare the different 
legal and economic concepts of subsidies. Next, we consider the different ways in which 
Chapter 11 allows an airline to restructure its business and reduce its costs, and assess 
3 
 
whether these involve subsidies.1 The analysis is then applied to two cases: the US-EU open 
skies area negotiations, as well as the ongoing “level playing field” dispute between the US 
and the Gulf airlines. In summary, we argue that there is no clearly relevant legal definition 
under which Chapter 11 involves a subsidy, and that Chapter 11 does not involve a subsidy 
under normal economic definitions of the term.2 
 
2 What is Chapter 11? 
Title 11 of the U.S.C. contains federal bankruptcy laws and details of the bankruptcy process. 
Title 11 is commonly referred to as the “Bankruptcy Code”. Companies can either file for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 (Liquidation) or under Chapter 11 (Reorganization) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Under Chapter 7, a trustee will liquidate the debtor’s assets after the 
company ended its operations to pay creditors in line with the regulations of the Bankruptcy 
Code. By contrast, Chapter 11 provides the debtor with the possibility to present a 
reorganization plan while keeping its business alive and paying creditors according to a 
renegotiated schedule. 
For a voluntary filing pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 301 there is no requirement stating that the 
debtor has to be insolvent or unable to pay its debts to file for Chapter 11 protection. Chapter 
11 is designed to provide a debtor with the best possible options for a successful 
reorganization. Therefore, such an insolvency criterion is not integrated in the bankruptcy 
code because otherwise it might already be too late for an effective reorganization. However, 
for an involuntary filing instituted by creditors certain financial requirements have to be 
fulfilled (11 U.S.C. § 303(b)). The absence of a financial requirement to institute a voluntary 
filing leads to the question how companies are prevented from using Chapter 11 as a mere 
business instrument. 
A court shall confirm a Chapter 11 reorganization plan only if “the plan has been 
proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law” (11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(3)). 
Therefore, the bankruptcy court has a little manoeuvring room in this regard. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
1 There is a limited number of studies that capture the effect of Chapter 11 on the airline industry. 
Predominantly, they consider the effect on prices in the US domestic market (Borenstein and Rose, 1995; Barla 
and Koo, 1999; Ciliberto and Schenone, 2012).  
2 While we conclude that access to bankruptcy laws shall not being considered as a formal form of a subsidy, 
it can still be perceived as a locational advantage of being registered in a particular country. Namely, similar 
to tax and labor laws, bankruptcy falls into this same class of advantages (or disadvantages).  
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the request to dismiss a Chapter 11 filing could arise earlier in the process. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 
(b) (4) provides a list of possible causes which allow the court to dismiss or convert a Chapter 
11 case. However, insolvency and “bad faith” are not included as possible causes. However, 
US “courts have consistently found that the prosecution of a chapter 11 case in ‘bad faith’ 
- although not listed as one of the examples - also constitutes ‘cause’ for dismissal or 
conversion under section 1112(b)” (Leake, 2004). Consequently, firms cannot easily use 
Chapter 11 as a mere business tool to cut down cost even if financial healthy because chances 
are high that such a case will be dismissed by court if the debtor cannot provide reasonable 
arguments for the bankruptcy filing. 
Chapter 11 provides manifold opportunities for financial distressed firms to reduce costs. 
We will focus on the six most important cost reduction possibilities available to Chapter 11 






Table 1: Core cost reduction opportunities under Chapter 11 
Cost reduction 
possibilities 
Summary of key aspects 
Renegotiation of 
Prepetition Debts 
Creditors’ claims are divided into secured claims, unsecured 
priority claims, unsecured nonpriority claims and equity 
security interests. Negotiated exit strategies usually include 
payment over time or conversion of debt to equity. Under 
certain conditions a court can force changes on creditors. 
Rejection of 
Executory Contracts 
Executory contracts under Title 11 are contracts “for which 
performance remains due to some extent on both sides” 
(Buchbinder and Cooper, 2009, p.202). A debtor can either 
reject or assume and cure any executory contract under a 
Chapter 11 filing at any time before the confirmation of the 
Chapter 11 plan. 
Rejection of Aircraft 
Leases 
In regard to aircraft leases, the debtor basically has options 
similar to the treatment of executory contracts with some 





If negotiations with an authorized representative of the 
employees fail, but the proposal was rejected without “good 
cause” and the modifications are “necessary” for the company 




The Bankruptcy Code does not confer the right to terminate a 
pension plan, except in specific circumstances. Employee 
Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) regulations 
allow for two options to terminate a defined benefit plan. In 
case of such a termination, the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) will insure the payment of these plans 
while filing claims against the debtor. 
Modification of 
Retiree Benefits 
The process to modify retiree benefits is similar to the process 




3 What is a subsidy? 
In order to address the question if Chapter 11 should be regarded as a subsidy, there are two 
possible perspectives: a legal perspective and an economic one. In this section, these 
concepts are discussed and compared. 
 
3.1 The Legal Perspective 
WTO (World Trade Organization) regulations and bilateral/multilateral Air Service 
Agreements constitute the main sources of applicable public international laws. The latter 
sometimes do, and sometimes do not, mention subsidies and their effects on competition 
between airlines from different countries. However, typically they do not define in detail 
what a subsidy is. Thus, we concentrate on the WTO definition. 
It should be noted that while we are setting out “legal” definitions, because the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) exclude airlines except in some minor ways, the definitions we are discussing do 
not have legal force. We are essentially setting out how subsidies might be defined, if air 
transport were handled in the same way as goods are treated in the GATT.  
 
3.1.1 World Trade Organization 
The WTO was founded 1995 as an international organization. Whereas services are 
regulated by the GATS, air transport services are nearly totally excluded from GATS 
regulations (Annex on Air Transport Services, GATS). However, competition law is still 
applicable via the former GATT and remains in force as a kind of umbrella treaty. 
Nevertheless, the WTO disciplines on subsidies in regard to industrial goods are today 
primarily contained in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement) which was established in the Uruguay Round (Ehlermann and Goyette, 2006). 
Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM defines the term subsidy in the context of WTO regulations as 
follows: “there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the 
territory of a Member […] or there is any form of income or price support […] and a benefit 
is thereby conferred.” 
This definition reveals two criteria which are important for the definition of a subsidy: 
the financial and the benefit criteria. Those two criteria will be discussed in greater detail 
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below. Furthermore, there is a third criterion, the specificity criterion. The specificity 
criterion is not important in regard to the definition of a subsidy. However, it is important in 
order to decide if further parts of the SCM are applicable or not (Article 1.2 SCM). Because 
this is beyond the scope of interest in regard to the fact that the SCM agreement does not 
apply to aviation, the specificity criterion will just be briefly introduced below for the sake 
of completeness. 
 
3.1.1.1 The Financial Criterion 
There is “financial contribution” pursuant to Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM where: 
i. a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and 
equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan 
guarantees); 
ii. government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal 
incentives such as tax credits); 
iii. a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or 
purchases goods; 
iv. a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a 
private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to 
(iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, 
in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments. 
Ehlermann and Goyette (2006) point out two important aspects about this definition: 
a) the use of the term “i.e.” in Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM indicates that the list is exhaustive, 
but the rather broad wording of the four measures opens a large scope of potential 
financial contributions; 
b) the recognition under subparagraph (iv) that a financial contribution is granted when 
a government directs a private body to provide a financial contribution under 
subparagraph (i) to (iii) suggests that in this regard the definition of a subsidy under 




3.1.1.2 The Benefit Criterion 
In addition, the recipient has to have a benefit through the financial contribution, otherwise 
it will not be consider as a subsidy in the WTO context. However, the definition of a benefit 
is a complex issue. Article 14 SCM provides some guidelines on how a possible benefit shall 
be calculated. First of all, Article 14 SCM states that any method used for calculating a 
possible benefit shall be transparent and adequately explained.  
Some explicit guidelines are provided by Article 14 SCM (a) to (d) for government 
provisions of equity, government loans, government loan guarantees and the provision of 
goods or services or purchase of goods by a government. In those cases, the benefit is 
measured as the difference between the conditions provided by the government and 
prevailing commercial market conditions.  
For example, if the government provides a loan to company, a benefit would exist if there 
is a difference between the amount the firm pays on the government loan and the amount the 
firm would have to pay on a comparable commercial loan. 
Therefore, a financial contribution of the government is not sufficient to constitute a 
subsidy. Solely the combination of the financial criterion and the benefit criterion constitute 
a subsidy under the SCM agreement. 
However, Article 14 SCM does not provide an exhaustive guideline on how to 
specifically calculate a recipient’s benefit. Nevertheless, it specifies the market as a 
benchmark in order to assess the question of benefits. 
 
3.1.1.3 The Specificity Criterion 
The specificity criterion is important in order to decide if the parts on prohibited subsidies, 
actionable subsidies and countervailing measures are applicable or not. The criterion has no 
influence on the definition of a subsidy itself. (Article 1.2 SCM). 
Ehlermann and Goyette (2006) identify three principles in regard to specificity and 
Article 2 SCM: 
(1) De jure specificity: This exists if access to a subsidy is explicitly limited to certain 
enterprises. 
(2) Presence of objective criteria: specificity does not exist where objective criteria are 
established which are neutral and do not favour certain enterprises over others, and 
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which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as number of 
employees or size of enterprise. 
(3) De facto specificity: If there are reasons to believe that a subsidy may in fact be 
specific, even in the absence of explicit limitation to certain enterprises or the 
presence and adherence to objective criteria or conditions, other factors will be 
considered. 
Because the specificity criterion does not play an important role in the scope of this work, 
the three principles will not be reviewed in greater detail. 
 
3.2 The Economic Perspective 
In contrast to the legal perspective, the economic perspective of subsidies is extremely 
vague. Gössling et al. (2017) address the topic of subsidies in aviation and discuss the 
importance of different definitions. With respect to the economic perspective, they follow 
an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition on 
subsidies. This is a specific definition which is used in a specific context, namely that of 
environmentally harmful subsidies. The OECD defines a subsidy as “any measure that keeps 
prices for consumers below market levels, or for producers above market levels, or that 
reduces costs for consumers or producers” (OECD, 2005, p. 114). 
In comparison to the legal definitions discussed above, the OECD definition is much 
broader and less specific. The first part of the OECD definition defines a measure as a 
subsidy if prices are kept below/above prevailing market conditions for 
consumers/producers. The reference to market conditions is similar to the benefit criterion 
in WTO and EU definitions of subsidies. However, the OECD definition refers to any 
measure whereas the WTO and EU definitions require the respective financial criteria to be 
fulfilled which are more restricting than the broader OECD approach. 
The second part of the OECD definition particularly addresses the topic of costs and 
covers the case that even if a measure does not influence prices, but leads to reduced costs, 
it should be regarded as a subsidy. 
The second part of the OECD definition is especially interesting in regard to Chapter 11 
because, in contrast to the WTO and the EU definition, the OECD definition does not require 
state resources to be involved. The reductio ad absurdum is that the whole Chapter 11 
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process would constitute a “subsidy” because where the financial contribution respectively 
cost savings are derived from is not important in regard to the OECD definition. But is this 
what the OECD means? 
What is clear from the context of the report is that a subsidy refers to a government or 
state subsidy, paid for by the taxpayer out of the government budget. Reading the whole of 
the OECD report, the term subsidy only refers to state subsidies—the possibility of subsidies 
funded from other sources is not considered.  
This is so for other references to subsidies in the economics literature. For example, 
classic writers on public economics, such as Shoup (1972) are quite clear that subsidies are 
paid by governments: “The economic theory of subsidy payments is the theory of how 
government can induce changes in relative prices […] in the private sector […]”. In its World 
Trade Report 2006, the WTO discusses subsidies and trade, but does not allow anything 
other than subsidies provided by the government (WTO, 2006). Gossling et al. (2017) only 
speak of government subsidies. 
Thus, in the economics literature, if the term subsidy is used, it refers to government 
subsidies, unless otherwise qualified.  
There are some examples of non-government subsidies – an important one is cross-
subsidies, whereby a firm takes resources from one of its divisions to give to another. 
Typically, these do not involve the government as the source of the funds. Subsidies are 
qualified in other ways. For example, the term “hidden subsidies” is used to describe 
government subsidies which have been masked in some way, and tax-subsidies refers to 
subsidies which have been created using the tax system. 
 
4 Evaluation of Chapter 11 
In this section, we evaluate the opportunities for cost reduction as induced by the Chapter 11 
process, we then focus on the termination of the pension plans and conclude by assessing 
whether Chapter 11 actually involves a subsidy.  
 
4.1 Opportunities for Cost Reduction under Chapter 11 
In this section, the above criteria for subsidies are used to evaluate the following six 
opportunities Chapter 11 offers to reduce costs.   
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a) Renegotiation on Pre-petition Debts 
b) Rejection of Executory Contracts 
c) Rejection of Aircraft Leases 
d) Modification of CBA 
e) Termination of Pension Plans 
f) Modification of Retiree Benefits 
 
We briefly discuss these opportunities below.  
a) Renegotiation on Pre-petition Debts 
Because the consent of the majority of creditors is required to get the Chapter 11 plan 
approved by the courts, it provides the debtor with a means of  getting rid of some claims, at 
least partially (Salerno et al., 2010). The US has a long history of privately owned airlines 
compared to other countries (Cappelli, 1995), which means that, in most cases the state or 
public bodies will not be creditors in this regard. Therefore, the crucial element in regard to 
most subsidy definitions (a support measure has to be granted from the state or through a 
state or a public body) will most probably not be fulfilled in regard to treatment of pre-
petition debts.3 However, if the state or a public body is a creditor, things could turn out 
differently. 
b) Rejection of Executory Contracts 
Executory contracts under Chapter 11 are contracts “for which performance remains due 
to some extent on both sides” (Buchbinder and Cooper, 2009). Licence agreements, real 
estate leases or equipment leases would be examples for executory contracts. 
11 U.S.C. § 365 provides the debtor with the possibility to either reject or assume 
executory contracts under a Chapter 11 filing at any time before the confirmation of the 
Chapter 11 plan by the court. In the US, commercial airports are in most cases run through 
a form of partnership of federal, state and local government and the private sector (Airport 
Cooperative Research Program, 2012). 
Therefore, it could be possible, e.g. in regard to rejected gate or terminal leases, that the 
government appears as a creditor with a pre-petition general unsecured claim. In such a 
                                                 
3 The date on which the bankruptcy is filed is referred to as the petition date. There are three stages: the pre-
petition date, the post petition, and the post confirmation stages. Pre-petition debts are those accrued prior to 
the filing of the case.  
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special case, one could argue that if the unsecured claim is impaired, this would constitute 
some form of financial contribution by the state or a public body. Thus, a rejected executory 
contract under Chapter 11 could fulfil the crucial criterion for subsidies in such a special 
case. 
In conclusion, § 365 can be a tool for an airline debtor to reject prematurely real estate 
leasing contracts for estates (e.g., for gates, terminals, hangars, office buildings) that either 
suffer from expensive rents or are not essential for the operation and reduce operating costs. 
Since most contracting parties in the airline industry are private companies, the rejection of 
executory contracts will most probably not fulfil the majority of definitions of subsidies. 
c) Rejection of Aircraft Leases 
11 U.S.C. § 1110 exclusively refers to the airline industry, specifically to aircraft 
equipment rentals. It is applicable to leased aircraft, aircraft engines and spare parts as 
defined in 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a)(3). The majority of aircraft lessors are private companies. 
Therefore, the financial benefit for the debtor in the case of a rejected leasing agreement is 
derived from those private firms. Consequently, a rejected aircraft lease contract will not 
fulfil the majority of definitions of subsidies. 
 
 d) Modifications of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). 
§1113 contains regulations concerning modifications to or rejection of a Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). In order to assess the importance of §1113 the following two 
points should be taken into account. The costs of wages and associated social security and 
pension payments account for a large part of an airline’s operating costs. Doganis (2010) 
estimated the share of labour costs for European and American carriers in the year 2007 to 
be around 25% of total operating costs. For low cost carriers the values were about half as 
much. 
In conclusion it can be said, that §1113 provides a means to the debtor to cut down wages 
and other labour contract terms which would not be possible under normal circumstances. 
These options can have a high impact on a debtors total operating costs because of the high 
share of labour costs within an airlines cost portfolio. However, because the employees are 
basically “paying the check”, modifications of CBAs will not fulfil any of the normal 
definitions of subsidies. 
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d) Termination of Pension Plans 
The Bankruptcy Code does not confer the right to terminate a pension plan by the debtor 
(Resnick and Sommer, 2016, para. 12.08). But, as mentioned above, the Bankruptcy Code 
could be a necessary means to create the required preconditions to terminate a pension plan 
under ERISA regulations. In particular, e) may involve recourse to support from a public 
body, and thus, under some definitions, may involve access to a subsidy. We explore this in 
detail in the following sub section (§4.2). 
e) Payment of Retiree Benefits 
Besides the renegotiation of CBA terms and the possibility to terminate pension plans 
during bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code addresses the issue of retiree benefits as well. 
Retiree benefits are defined as “payments for retired employees and their spouses and 
dependents, for medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the event of 
sickness, accident, disability, or death” (11 U.S.C. § 1114(a)). 
The financial benefit for the debtor is, similar to the case of modifications to CBAs, 
directly derived from the employees due to curtailments in regard to the retiree benefits 
initially agreed upon. Consequently, modifications of retiree benefits will not fulfil the core 
criterion of most definitions on subsidies. 
In conclusion, it can be said that §1114 is an important supplement to §1113 on CBAs 
and to the ERISA regulations on pension plans. However, unlike the termination of pension 
plans, the modification of retiree benefits will not fulfil any of the normal definitions of 
subsidies. 
Since we conclude that only e) may meet the criteria, we, therefore, further elaborate on 
this opportunity.  
 
4.2 Termination of Pension Plans  
While a complete coverage of this topic is beyond the scope of this work, some background 
information is necessary in order to understand the termination process of pension plans. In 
the US, two broad types of pension plans exist: defined benefit plans and defined 
contribution plans.  
Defined contribution plans are plans in which contributions are placed in individual 
accounts and the accumulated amount is distributed in a specified manner upon retirement. 
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Employee contributions are voluntary but usually contributions are made by both the 
employer and the employee. Defined contribution plans are not insured, because the 
employer is not allowed to use the money in the respective saving accounts for any other 
purpose. Therefore, defined contribution plans do not play any role in bankruptcy cases 
because they cannot be underfunded (Elliott, 2009). 
Defined benefit plans provide a clearly defined benefit upon retirement based on years of 
service and earned wage. Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) 
regulations define minimum funding requirements. However, variations in investment 
performance and the firms’ abilities to defer payments under certain conditions pose a risk 
of those plans to be underfunded at a certain point in time. Therefore, the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was founded 1974 under ERISA to insure the payment of 
these plans (Elliott, 2009). The PBGC is an established body within the Department of 
Labour pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1302. Thus, the PBGC is a federal agency. 
There are basically two different types of insured pension plans: single-employer plans 
and multi-employer plans. In single-employer plans the PBGC pays plan benefits in the case 
of a plan termination if the plan does not have enough assets upon this date, whereas multi-
employer plans are maintained by several companies and labour unions together within the 
same industry. In multi-employer plans, the PGBC acts in a similar fashion to a re-insurer, 
because if a plan sponsor withdraws from a plan, the liabilities are assumed by the remaining 
firms (Office of Management and Budget, 2016). 
The PBGC obtains funding from insurance premiums from plan sponsors, investment 
income and recoveries obtained from actions against firms formerly responsible for the 
plans, without the involvement of general tax revenues (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp, 
2015). 
There are two different types of insurance premiums: flat rate and variable rate. Flat rate 
premiums have to be paid on a per person basis by all plans. The variable premiums only 
have to be paid by some underfunded plans. However, the different rates are set by Congress 
and the PBGC is not allowed to adjust the rates taking into account, e.g., the risk of a certain 
plan (Office of Management and Budget, 2016). 
Another funding source of the PBGC is investment income. With $392 million 
investment income in the financial year 2015, it is however a smaller source of income 
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compared to the $4.35 billion of received insurance premiums (Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corp, 2015). The PBGC is primarily focussing on investments with small risks such as US 
government securities (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp, 2015). 
Upon termination of pension plans, the PBGC tries to recover the difference between the 
liabilities of the plan and the value of the plan’s assets from the former plan sponsor. Such 
claims are treated as nonpriority general unsecured claims and are often impaired under a 
Chapter 11 plan. Therefore the PBGC usually only recovers small parts of such claims 
(Elliott, 2009). 
At the end of 2015, the single-employer and the multi-employer plans were underfunded 
by $76 billion, and therefore the budget proposed to further increase premiums and give the 
PBGC the authority to adjust them (Office of Management and Budget, 2016). Nevertheless 
the PBGC has enough assets to pay benefits for a number of years (Office of Management 
and Budget, 2013).  
ERISA regulations basically allow for three options to terminate a defined benefit plan: 
a standard termination according to 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b), a distress termination by the plan 
sponsor if certain criteria are met (29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)) or an involuntary termination 
by the PBGC pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a). Both, the distress termination and the 
involuntary termination, could be applicable in the scope of a Chapter 11 case. 
Any company can terminate pension plans (if not prohibited by CBAs in force) via a 
standard termination at any time. However, upon plan termination, the plan has to be fully 
funded and all benefits have to be either paid to beneficiaries via lump-sum payments or via 
purchased private annuities (Munnell and Soto, 2007). 
Instead of terminating pension plans, freezing a plan is another option to cut down long 
term financial obligations. Freezing pension plans basically means that the defined benefit 
plans for employees remain ongoing and the same funding requirements have to be met as 
before. However, depending on the type of a freeze, certain restrictions apply. In a “closed 
freeze” no new employees can join the plan but plan participants continue to accrue benefits. 
In a “hard freeze” all benefit accruals are stopped. In a “soft freeze” employees cannot earn 
future benefits through further years of service but for salary increases (Munnell and Soto, 
2007). Therefore, by freezing a plan, financial obligations are reduced without the immediate 
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payment requirements as in a standard termination. Both options can be exercised any time, 
if allowed in the scope of applicable CBAs. 
If a debtor wants to transfer the liabilities of an underfunded plan to the PBGC, a distress 
termination has to be initiated. Therefore, the so called “distress criteria” pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B) have to be met. The most important one is that “the bankruptcy court 
[…] determines that, unless the plan is terminated, such person will be unable to pay all its 
debts pursuant to a plan of reorganization and will be unable to continue in business outside 
the chapter 11 reorganization process and approves the termination” (29 U.S.C. § 
1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)). 
If the PBGC wants to terminate a pension plan in the context of a bankruptcy case, it 
typically relies on 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4) (Lewis and Melwani, 2006). The argumentation 
of this paragraph is as follows: if there are reasons to believe that the long-run losses to be 
expected by the PBGC would increase if the plan is not terminated, the PBGC can institute 
a termination proceeding. The outcome of such an involuntary termination is basically equal 
to a distress termination initiated by the Chapter 11 debtor. 
Large cost saving could be achieved with a distress or involuntary termination during a 
Chapter 11 case. The assumed liabilities by the PBGC through the pension plan terminations 
of United Airlines, US Airways and Delta Air Lines are in the top ten of the largest liabilities 
assumed by the PBGC between 1975-2014 (Office of Management and Budget, 2016). 
Upon an involuntary or distress termination of a pension plan, the PBGC could have three 
types of claims against the debtor in order to try to recover at least parts of the assumed 
liabilities of a terminated pension plan. First of all, the so-called “unfunded benefit liabilities 
claim” (difference between the liabilities of the plan and the value of the plan’s assets). 
Secondly, there could be a claim for unpaid minimum funding contributions and thirdly, a 
claim for unpaid pension plan termination insurance premiums. (Lewis and Melwani, 2006, 
p. 166) 
The further development of those claims is dependent on several factors. If the pension 
plan is terminated before the plan sponsor files for Chapter 11 protection, the automatic stay 
prevents the PBGC in the first place to enforce its claims. If the plan is terminated after the 
bankruptcy filing, different procedures apply. According to Lewis and Melwani (2006), 
PBGC claims are in most cases treated as nonpriority general unsecured claims. This 
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classification has a major impact on the amount of funds the PBGC can get from the debtor 
under a reorganization plan. 
Consequently, despite the point that Chapter 11 itself does not confer the right to 
terminate pension plans as of right, the fact that a company is under Chapter 11 protection 
and the severity of the financial situation might fulfil the criterion for a distress termination 
or lead to an involuntary termination by the PBGC. A distress termination would not be 
available to firms outside of Chapter 11 protection. Furthermore, the option to modify CBAs 
under Chapter 11 could clear the way for every option discussed above in the case that 
current CBA terms restricted them from being exercised. 
The financial benefit for the debtor in the case of a distress or involuntary termination is 
directly derived from the PBGC because the PBGC assumes the liabilities of the respective 
plans upon termination. Because the PBGC is a public body within the Department of Labour 
such a termination proceeding will fulfil some of the definitions of subsidies, even if the 
PBGC obtains its funds without using taxpayers’ money. However, some narrower 
definitions on subsidies may require the involvement of tax money to classify a support 
measure as a subsidy.  
This discussion shows that the termination of pension plans and the assumption of the 
liabilities through the PBGC is the most critical strategy in regard to the six core cost 
reduction possibilities and the question of whether Chapter 11 should be considered as 
involving a subsidy. However, in recent Chapter 11 cases (e.g., the American Airlines case), 
pension plans were not terminated but frozen, induced through a more aggressive approach 
of the PBGC in order to avoid large claims by the debtor. Such a procedure, like a standard 
termination, does not involve PBGC money and therefore the argument with respect to the 
term subsidy turns out differently. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the ERISA termination options for pension plans can 
lead to a major cost relief for Chapter 11 debtors. The termination of pension plans is a 





4.3 Does Chapter 11 involve a Subsidy? 
Under the economic perspective, Chapter 11 does not involve a subsidy (unless the extreme 
interpretation of the OECD definition is adopted). There is no transfer from the taxpayer or 
the government budget to the airline undergoing Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Of the six 
opportunities in which costs can be reduced, five of them involve transfers from other bodies, 
specifically the shareholders of the airline or its employees. 
The final opportunity for cost reduction involves termination of pension plans, under 
specific conditions. However, this does not involve any transfer from the government. The 
PBGC is an insurance agency. Under Chapter 11, under very specific conditions, the PBGC 
takes over the pension liabilities of the airline. The PBGC is a self-funded agency which 
derives its income, primarily, from charging airline (and other) participants premiums, like 
other insurance agencies or companies. It would seem strange that making a successful claim 
from an insurance company or agency, which the government does not contribute to, should 
be regarded as gaining a “subsidy”. 
Under the legal perspective, matters are more complicated.  Using the WTO definition 
most of the avenues for cost reduction afforded by Chapter 11 do not apply, since the most 
of them are paid for by the shareholders or workforces of the airline. The exception is 
termination of pension plans. 
In case of a termination of a pension plan of an airline the PBGC will taking over the 
payments. For there to be a subsidy, there needs to be a “financial contribution” from a 
“public body”. The PBGC is a public body, and to this extent, the terms of the WTO 
definition is met. However, it needs to be recognised that the PBGC is an insurance agency, 
which is not funded by the government, but rather, funded by premiums of the firms 
participating in the scheme. When an airline enters Chapter 11, it makes a claim under its 
insurance policy. Does this constitute a “financial contribution”? Only if this is deemed to 
be the case, would there be a subsidy. 
 
 
5 Chapter 11 and International Subsidy Disputes 
Allegations that Chapter 11 embodies an element of subsidy have featured in two recent 
international aviation disputes. The first of these concerns the operation of the EU-US (Open 
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Skies) Air Transport Agreement. A more recent, and much more contentious, dispute is that 
concerning the claim by the three major US airlines that the Gulf airlines are competing 
unfairly because they have access to large government subsidies. We consider each of these 
in turn. 
5.1 Chapter 11 and the EU-US Open skies negotiations 
In the tenth meeting of the U.S.-EU Joint Committee in 2011 the European delegation 
expressed its concerns about possible distortionary effects of American Airlines filing for 
Chapter 11 on the competitive situation on the North Atlantic market. Furthermore, the 
delegation stated that they view Chapter 11 as a government subsidy. The U.S. delegation 
took an opposite point of view. (U.S.-EU Joint Committee, 2011) 
The minutes of the Joint Committee meeting emphasizes the importance of Chapter 11 in 
relation to the North Atlantic. In the subsequent meetings of the Joint Committee the 
discussion in regard to Chapter 11 was not continued. Instead, a few updates on the ongoing 
Chapter 11 process were given, and the possible merger between American Airlines and US 
Airways was briefly addressed (U.S.-EU Joint Committee, 2012, 2013). 
In contrast to the US-UAE case (see §5.2), the EU-US Air Transport Agreement (ATA) 
contains a specific article on subsidies with a rather broad definition. Yet, despite the fact 
that the definition in Article 14 of the EU-US ATA does not contain elements such as the 
benefit and specificity criterion in the SCM definition and furthermore defines the financial 
contribution aspects very openly in a non-exhaustive list, the key point of the government 
entity remains. Therefore, it would be difficult to identify other aspects of Chapter 11 that 
would fit the definition except pension plans. While the EU delegation would have some 
good ground to base their claim on pension plans their position was weakened by a change 
in the American Airlines bankruptcy case.   
American Airlines initially sought to terminate its pension plans. However, this was 
rejected by the bankruptcy court. On May 4, 2012, American Airlines reached an agreement 
with the PBGC not to terminate the pension plans but to freeze them. Freezing the plans 
basically means that the defined benefit plans for employees remain ongoing but employees 
cannot earn future benefits through further years of service and no new employees can join 
the plan (Seider et al., 2015). Therefore, there were no costs to the PBGC in this case and 
subsequently, the PBGC withdrew all its claims on February 11, 2014. To conclude, a 
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pension plan freeze represents a compromise - the debtor can shed future commitments that 
would arise under the plan otherwise, but there are no costs to the PBGC because the debtor 
remains responsible for paying the benefits that added up until the time of the freeze.  
 
5.2 Chapter 11 and the US-Gulf Airlines Subsidy Dispute 
This dispute began when the three major US airlines (American, United and Delta) published 
a paper (Partnership for Fair and Open Skies, 2015) which alleged that the three large Gulf 
airlines (Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways) were competing unfairly on their routes to the 
US because they had access to large subsidies from their governments. The former called on 
the US government for action. The Gulf airlines responded by claiming that Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings constituted a form of subsidy to the US airlines. At this stage, the 
US government has investigated the claims, though it has not taken any substantive action, 
and the dispute is far from settled.  
In their original claim, the US airlines were not admitting that their recourse to Chapter 
11 gave them any advantage or was a subsidy. However, they did use the WTO definition 
of a subsidy, even though, as Emirates pointed out, it was not appropriate, given that airlines 
are not covered by the GATT or GATS (except in minor ways). Nevertheless, Emirates did 
take the WTO definition as a convenient and relevant definition, even though it does not 
have legal force in the airline case.  
We consider the legal and economic perspectives in turn. If the WTO definition were 
applied, it is possible that some aspects of Chapter 11 might be construed as a subsidy. In 
particular, the termination of pension plans might be regarded as a subsidy. The PBGC is a 
public agency, and having this body take over pensions might be construed as the airline 
receiving a “financial contribution” from it (even though it has paid for it through its 
premiums). In its response to the “White Paper”, Emirates (2015) claims that the termination 
of pension plans does constitute a subsidy, which may be so if the WTO definition is used. 
However, it also claimed that relief of debts also involves a subsidy, though it does not show 
that this comes about through a public body. 
The economic perspective is more straightforward. None of the avenues which Chapter 
11 affords necessarily involves a grant or subsidy from the state. Shareholders and 
workforces are the source of the funding in most cases. Even though a public body is 
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involved in guaranteeing pension plans, the PBGC is effectively an insurance agency which 
takes premiums from industry and pays out benefits back to firms under specific conditions. 




The notion that Chapter 11 provides a subsidy to US airlines has been used in a number of 
international air transport disputes, and more recently, it has been raised in the context of the 
dispute between the US and the Gulf countries. In this paper, we have sought to explore 
whether access to Chapter 11 by the US airlines gives rise to avenues which could be defined 
“subsidies”.  
Much depends on how “subsidies” are defined. One approach is to consider public 
international law. The most relevant source of this is the definition, used by the WTO in its 
GATT and GATS agreements. However, neither of these applies to airlines—while airlines 
provide a traded service, they are almost entirely exempt from GATS. One critical aspect of 
this definition defines a subsidy as including funding from “public bodies” be it sourced 
from the government, or any other source, including the industry itself. There have been 
other definitions used by international bodies, such as the OECD. However, these have no 
legal force. Using an OECD definition, it might seem that Chapter 11 can give rise to 
subsidies, though it needs to be noted that this may be taking the definition out of context (it 
only considers subsidies which are funded by the government). 
Economists often talk about subsidies, but they rarely define them in any specific way. 
However, it does seem that they understand subsidies, almost invariably, as being grants 
from the government, either directly or indirectly. In this respect, the definition is more 
specific than the WTO definition.  
Chapter 11 creates six possible avenues for cost reduction. We consider these in detail, 
and conclude that only one, termination of pension plans, might involve a subsidy. All of the 
others involve either shareholders or workforces covering the cost. With Termination of 
Pension Plans, the airline may have access to funding of its plan by a public body, the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (the PBGC), which is a public body. If one were use 
the WTO definition of a subsidy, this could be counted as a subsidy. On the other hand, this 
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“subsidy” is funded by industry itself, through the premiums it pays to the PBGC.  Using the 
economist’s common view of a subsidy, this would not be counted as a subsidy, since 
industry not the government is paying. 
We discuss two recent cases where Chapter 11 has been alleged to have involved a 
subsidy. The first case, involving the negotiations between the US and the EU over an open 
skies agreement, the European side were concerned about the workings of Chapter 11. The 
issue was not pursued, partly because over the period of the negotiations, Chapter 11 was 
not invoked to terminate any airline’s pension plans. In the ongoing dispute between the US 
and Gulf carriers, it has been alleged that the US airlines have been subsidised via Chapter 
11. Emirates, in its submission, correctly recognised that the WTO definition of subsidy is 
not applicable to airlines, but it adopts this definition as a convenient one, and argues that 
having pension plans being funded by “public body” constitutes a subsidy. However, it did 
not mention that this body is funded by industry premiums, and does not involve funding 
from the government. Under a normal economic definition of subsidy, this would not be 
regarded as a subsidy.  
While not a subsidy, Chapter 11 offers US airlines the opportunity to restructure their 
business and compete with other non-US airlines more successfully. If and to what extent 
this opportunity is an advantage depends on many factors - after all, an insurance premium 
is not costless, and in most countries insolvency protection law offers similar opportunities. 
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